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ABSTRACT
Recently, botnets such as Mirai and Persirai targeted IoT devices
on a large scale. We consider aacks by botnets on cyber-physical
systems (CPS), which require advanced capabilities such as control-
ling the physical processes in real-time. Traditional botnets are not
suitable for this goal mainly because they lack process control capa-
bilities, are not optimized for low latency communication, and bots
generally do not leverage local resources. We argue that such at-
tacks would require cyber-physical botnets. A cyber-physical botnet
needs coordinated and heterogeneous bots, capable of performing
adversarial control strategies while subject to the constraints of the
target CPS.
In this work, we present CPSBot, a framework to build cyber-
physical botnets. We present an example of a centralized CPSBot
targeting a centrally controlled system and a decentralized CPSBot
targeting a system distributed control. We implemented the former
CPSBot using MQTT for the C&C channel and Modbus/TCP as the
target network protocol and we used it to launch several aacks on
real and simulated Water Distribution. We evaluate our implemen-
tation with distributed reply and distributed impersonation aacks
on a CPS, and show that malicious control with negligible latency
is possible.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Botnets are still one of the major threats in the cyber-security land-
scape. IT botnets take advantage of Internet services such as IRC,
HTTP, email, and DNS to achieve dierent goals including informa-
tion and identity the, spam, DDoS and malware distribution [48].
e Mirai and Persirai IoT botnets are typical examples of IT botnets
for DDoS [6]. In the OT space, we have seen advanced malware
such as Stuxnet [18] and Blackenergy [29, 36] using botnet-like
components to aect the availability of the target cyber-physical
system (e. g., DoS and damaging the equipment).
However, we have not seen botnets capable of cyber-physical sys-
tem (CPS) adversarial control. We claim that current botnet designs
are not sucient to achieve this goal, mainly because high-impact
aacks on a CPS require dierent strategies than conventional
cyber-security aacks [23, 49]. ese strategies translate into addi-
tional requirements that are not addressed by conventional botnet
designs. For example, a conventional botnet does not dierentiate
its bots according to the capabilities of the infected devices and
does not allow coordinated interactions among the bots. We think
that it is benecial to introduce a new class of botnets, dened
as cyber-physical botnets, designed to overcome those additional
challenges. We expect that beer understanding of capabilities
and shortcomings of cyber-physical botnets will raise awareness
with stakeholders of threatened systems, and allow the defenders
to design more suitable countermeasures.
In this paper, we present CPSBot, a framework to build cyber-
physical botnets. CPSBot enables to build botnets with heteroge-
neous and coordinated bots able to take over the control of a CPS.
CPSBot is generic over the target CPS, it allows to develop botnets
with dierent network architectures and to use dierent adversarial
control strategies. We underline two of the most important design
choices that we made to satisfy our requirements. Firstly, we use
a novel command and control channel based on the publisher-sub-
scriber (PubSub) paradigm [7, 17] to get precise coordination among
bots with minimal overheads. Secondly, we dene a set of orthogo-
nal functionality that we call traits to customize the development
of a CPSBot. is modular approach is used to exploit the func-
tionalities oered by dierent infected devices of a cyber-physical
system and to customize the C&C servers.
Our aacker model considers a botmaster that already man-
aged to infect the target devices (how is outside the scope of this
work). We present two design examples of CPSBots targeting a
centrally controlled system and a system with distributed control.
We compare our examples against the traditional counterparts and
we motivate why we think that the laer are not sucient to enable
adversarial control of the target systems. We provide an implemen-
tation of the centralized botnet where an aacker is coordinating
infected gateway devices to inuence the distribution of water
across remote substations. We use MQTT for the C&C protocol
and we target the Modbus/TCP industrial protocol.
We used our implementation to perform two coordinated cyber-
physical aacks on real and simulated Water Distribution. e rst
aack is dened as distributed impersonation and the aacker is
able to simultaneously impersonate geographically-sparse remote
terminal units. e second aack is dened as distributed replay
and the aacker is able to reply values and control actions across
(potentially heterogeneous) devices in dierent substations.
We argue that traditional botnet metrics, such as number of bots
and DoS bandwidth, are not sucient to evaluate a cyber-physical
botnet. Hence, we dene our own set of quantitative metrics suit-
able to evaluate the CPSBot framework such as adversarial control
period and additional delay introduced by CPSBot and we use those
metrics to evaluate our cyber-physical aacks.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
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• We propose CPSBot a framework to design cyber-physical
botnets. Our framework addresses the extra-requirements
introduced when aacking a cyber-physical system such as
adversarial control and bots coordination capabilities. We
use a publisher-subscriber command and control channel
and traits to address those extra-requirements.
• We design a centralized and a decentralized CPSBots tar-
geting a centrally controlled system and a system with
distributed control. We implement the former botnet opti-
mizing it for precise coordination among bots using MQTT
features such as quality of service, persistent sessions and
asynchronous communication.
• We launch two coordinated cyber-physical aacks: distri-
buted impersonation and distributed replay to assess our
implementation. Both aacks were performed on simu-
lated and real water distribution testbeds, with minor code
modications. We evaluate them with our quantitative
metrics for cyber-physical botnets.
is work is organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide the
background about botnets, cyber-physical systems and our target
water distribution system. In Section 3 we present the design of
CPSBot starting from our problem statement and threat model. We
focus on the PubSub C&C channel and the CPSBot traits. en,
we show two examples of centralized and decentralized CPSBots.
We conclude the section with our set of quantitative metrics for
cyber-physical botnets. In Section 4, we present how we imple-
mented a centralized CPSBot using MQTT and Modbus/TCP to
aack our target water distribution system. In Section 5 we de-
scribe the CPSBot aack phases and we present and evaluate the
distributed impersonation and distributed replay aacks using the
implemented centralized botnet. We discuss several CPSBot at-
tack strategies and optimizations in Section 6. Related works are
summarized in Section 7, and we conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Botnets
A botnet is a network of compromised hosts (bots) that are man-
aged by one or more command and control (C&C) servers. e
aacker (botmaster) is connected to the C&C infrastructure and
she is sending directives to the bots through it. e channel of
communication between the aacker and the bots is called C&C
channel, and it is one of the most important parts of a botnet [48].
A canonical way to classify a botnet is by its network architecture.
Most commonly a botnet is either centralized or decentralized1.
A centralized architecture has one C&C server that communi-
cates with all the bots. A client-server protocol is used for the C&C
channel (e. g., IRC or HTTP). e main advantages of this setup are
its low latency and ease of coordination. e main weaknesses of
this setup are its vulnerability to single point of failure and network
scalability issues when the number of bots increases. Alternatively,
in a decentralized architecture, all compromised devices are used
both as bots and C&C servers. e C&C channel uses a peer-to-
peer protocol (P2P) such that the bots establish an overlay network.
is architecture is self-scalable and does not suer from single
1In this context decentralized in synonymous of distributed.
point of failure. However, it might be dicult to implement (e. g.,
hosts behind NAT) and coordinate (e. g., orders from multiple C&C).
ere are also hybrid architectures that provide a tradeo between
centralized and decentralized schemes, and random architectures
where the bots are not contacting the C&C server but they are
waiting to be contacted by the botmaster.
It is possible to represent the state of a botnet using a ve-phases
lifecycle. We have an initial infection phase, where the aacker
exploits one or more vulnerabilities on a remote machine. e
remote machine becomes a bot candidate. In the second infection
phase, the same infected machine is instructed to download and
execute dierent types of malware. If the malicious code is eective
then the infected machine becomes part of the botnet. In the third
phase, the bot contacts the C&C server and this process is dened
as rallying. e rallying phase might be accomplished using static
addresses or dynamic addressing techniques such as DNS fast-ux,
and domain generation algorithms (DGA). e fourth phase is
the aack phase, where the bot perform malicious activities and
might still exchange information with the C&C (e. g., exltrate data).
e last phase is the maintenance phase, where a botmaster might
modify the bot network conguration, upload new aack payloads
and update the cryptographic keys of the botnet.
e C&C channel uses either the same protocol of the target
system or a custom protocol (dened as neoteric [55]). e former
approach is, in general, less easy to detect because the malicious
network trac is similar to the expected one. However, once the
extra-trac is detected then the defender can isolate the oending
trac and try to understand what is going on. e laer approach
generates network trac that might stand out compared to the
normal one. On the other hand, it is more dicult for the defender
to decode the information carried in a neoteric packet [28].
2.2 Cyber-Physical Systems (Security)
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are composed of heterogeneous de-
vices that are interacting with a physical process. ese devices
are typically interconnected and they are programmed to perform
general-purpose or domain-specic tasks, including sensing, ac-
tuating, and networking. It is possible to divide cyber-physical
systems (CPS) in two categories: CPS with a central or distributed
control. In the rst case, the CPS uses a central monitoring and
control infrastructure. For example, a water distribution industrial
control system is centrally controlled by a SCADA server. In the
second case, the CPS uses multiple controllers, each controller man-
ages a sub-system and it is able to communicate with the other
controllers. For example, a building automation system (BAS) is an
example of a distributed control system. ere are also examples
of distributed control system where the control logic of one con-
troller depends on signals coming from other ones. ese signals
are called interlocks. A water treatment system is an example of
an interlock-based distributed control system.
e usage of Internet-friendly protocols and commodity hard-
ware vastly increased the aack surface of cyber-physical sys-
tems [9, 30, 32, 38]. CPS are vulnerable to classic information se-
curity threats, aacks targeting the underlying physical processes,
and the intersection between the two [24]. In this paper, we are
interested in the laer type of aacks, dened as cyber-physical
aacks (e. g., aack over the network that permanently damages a
local component).
2.3 eWater Distribution (WaDi)
e Water Distribution (WaDi) testbed is a water distribution au-
tonomous systems built at Singapore University of Technology and
Design (SUTD) in 2016. It is designed as a down-scaled version of
the water transmission and distribution system operated in Singa-
pore. WaDi enables simulating dierent water demand paerns,
water hammer eects, changes in pipe pressures and pipe leak-
ages. Furthermore, it allows simulating water pollution by means
of organic and inorganic contaminants that can be added to the
distribution of water to the consumers.
WaDi is composed of three sub-processes: water supply, water
distribution, and water return. e rst stage operates by taking
the source water from two elevated raw water tanks (2500L each)
and transferring it to two elevated reservoirs (1250L each). In this
stage, water quality analyzers are used to verify the incoming water
quality. In the second stage, the potable water is distributed to six
consumers tanks (500L each). e water demand of Each consumer
tank can be set independently and changed in real-time. In the
third stage, the water is collected in the single water return tank
(2000L) and then optionally returned back to the supply stage.
WaDi has dierent types of sensors (e. g., water level sensors,
ow meters, water quality sensors) and actuators (e. g., water pumps,
valves). e remote terminal units are SCADAPack 334E devices
(Schneider Electric), the gateway devices are MOXA oncell G3111-
HSPA and the industrial switches are MOXA ED5 205A. e WaDi
supervisory network uses the Modbus/TCP industrial protocol.
3 CPSBOTS FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS
In this section, we present our problem statement and the related
system and aacker model. en, we focus on the CPSBot C&C
channel and on the traits. We show the high-level architecture
of two CPSBots: a centralized botnet for ICS and a decentralized
botnet for IoT. We conclude the section dening a set of quantitative
metrics derived from the design of our botnets.
3.1 Problem Statement
Our main challenge is related to adversarial control of a system that
has a physical process and several interconnected heterogeneous
devices (i. e., a cyber-physical system). With adversarial control,
we refer to the aacker’s capability to steer the physical process of
the target system into states of her choice. Typically, this requires
both understanding of the physical process, and a suitable control
strategy (e.g., using closed loop control).
We think that traditional botnets are not sucient to launch
coordinated aacks on CPS systems for several reasons. Firstly,
they do not address the problem of adversarial control, and they
are instead focusing mostly on system disruption (e. g., DDoS) and
observation (e. g., eavesdropping). Adversarial control of the system
would require near real-time exchange of eavesdropped data and
malicious control commands between distributed bots together
with one or more adversarial controllers. We argue that traditional
botnets are not designed to provide such features. Secondly, IT
botnets consider their bots as a homogeneous set of devices (e. g.,
Figure 1: Attacker goal: real-time adversarial control strat-
egy using a cyber-physical botnet.
zombies), without exploiting their dierent hardware and soware
capabilities [48]. However, in a cyber-physical botnet, some bots
have dierent roles such as inuencing the physical process and
spoong the monitoring system. irdly, traditional botnet designs
are not optimized for CPS constraints such as latency, packet size
and throughput. In our case, these constraints have to be taken into
account and measured in some way.
In summary, we would like to build a new class of botnets able to
perform coordinated cyber-physical aacks. We dene those bot-
nets as cyber-physical. In general, a cyber-physical botnet have to
resemble a control system, and the main diculties to be addressed
in its design are the following:
• Introduce an adversarial and coordinated control strategy
on a CPS in real-time.
• Exploit the diversity of the bots, including their specic
hardware and soware capabilities.
• Evaluate the tradeo between richness of bots functionality
and associated overheads using sound metrics.
3.2 System and Attacker Models
Our system model focuses on two types of cyber-physical systems:
a system with centralized control and a system with distributed
control.
Centralized Control. We consider a (potentially geographically
distributed) system composed of n substations that are centrally
controlled (e. g., a water distribution system). Each substation is
controlled by a remote terminal unit (RTU) that is able to read sensor
values and control actuators. ere are no intrusion detection
systems deployed in the substations. A central SCADA server is
periodically monitoring the substations and it can send commands
to the RTUs. A network-based intrusion detection system (IDS)
is monitoring the inbound and outbound trac from the SCADA
network.
Distributed Control. We consider an IoT system with distributed
control (e. g., a building automation system) that is deploying m
devices. Each device has a specic functionality such as monitor and
control the temperature of a room (e. g., HVAC), video surveillance
(e. g., CCTC), and lighting control system (e. g., LCS).
Attacker model. We consider an aacker who already completed
the necessary steps to map the network of the target system, infect
the devices, and perform the rallying phase (e. g., the aacker is able
to remotely contact the bots via the C&C). We believe that this is a
reasonable aacker model to adopt both in the ICS and IoT scenario
given the recent trends and surveys [15, 37, 43, 46]. e main
goal of the aacker is to use bots in a coordinated fashion to take
control over the target cyber-physical system, adding an adversarial
operation in the closed-loop control routines (see Figure 1). In this
setup the aacker, as the original controller, takes advantage of
readings from multiple sensors (coming from dierent bots) and use
this knowledge to send malicious actuation command to drive the
system to an arbitrary state or sequence of states. roughout the
paper, we use the words aacker and botmaster interchangeably.
3.3 CPSBot: PubSub C&C Channel
We propose to use publish-subscribe (PubSub) messaging paern
for the C&C channel. In a PubSub scheme, there are three entities:
the publisher (sender), the subscriber (receiver) and the broker (dis-
patcher). e communication is event-driven and there is a loose
coupling between the sender and the receiver. is scheme encour-
ages the use of asynchronous communications in contrast with
client-server periodic request-response cycles (e. g., polling) [7, 17].
In our context, we consider a cyber-physical botnet with heteroge-
neous bots subscribed to relevant events (e. g., sensor values and
actuator states) and one or more C&C nodes publishing commands
and updating events based on those values in real-time. To the best
of our knowledge, the PubSub scheme has not been proposed for a
botnet C&C channel before, and is particularly well suited for our
application.
Traditional IT botnets are using dierent C&C control protocols
mainly because they target dierent systems (e. g., client-server
architecture). For example, IRC, DNS, email, and HTTP protocols
are popular choices [55]. In our system models (e. g., ICS, and
IoT) those choices are either inapplicable (e. g., the protocol is not
spoken in the system) or sub-optimal. As an illustration, HTTP is
sub-optimal because it is a client-server protocol (not event-driven)
and it is not designed for machine-to-machine communications
(packet size is not a problem)2.
We list some crucial advantages that we think we would gain
from a PubSub control channel compared to conventional ones in
the context of ICS and IoT systems:
• Flexible coordination among bots and C&C :
– Enabled by event-driven messaging.
– It allows using synchronous and asynchronous mes-
saging schemes, multicast trac, proactive and reac-
tive bots coordination.
• Compatibility with dierent botnet architectures:
– Enabled by loose coupling of publishers and subscribers.
– It allows building conventional (centralized, decentral-
ized) and non-conventional (hybrid, random) botnets.
• Addresses traditional and CPS botnets constraints:
– Enabled by the nature of PubSub intended for reliable
and secure machine-to-machine communication [10,
41].
– It allows scaling the botnet size maintaining low com-
putational and trac overheads. For example, we
can use anonymity [16], condentiality and integrity
mechanisms such as TLS or alternatives [27].
3.4 CPSBot: Bot Traits
We already introduced the problem of cyber-physical bot hetero-
geneity that translates into the need of bots supporting dierent
functionalities. ose functionalities derive from the role of a bot in
2 We can apply a similar reasoning for the other traditional C&C protocols.
an aack and they are limited from the soware and hardware ca-
pabilities of the bot. We address the heterogeneity challenge using
CPSBot traits. A trait represents a set of functionalities that a CPS-
Bot device might support. is enables to design a cyber-physical
botnet that is modular (e. g., reuse same functionality across dif-
ferent devices), extensible (e. g., improve a functionality without
aecting the others), and composable (e. g., mix functionalities in a
single device). We note that traits allow to customize both the bots
and the C&Cs. We borrow the concept of trait from object-oriented
programming theory [47]. We describe six traits that are relevant
to our paper:
Inltrator. e Inltrator aects the network conguration of the
infected device. For example, it might congure the bot as a mali-
cious proxy able to passively observe trac, actively send payloads,
forward trac to another network interface, and disconnect the
bot from an arbitrary network. In a typical setup, the number of
Inltrators scales linearly with the number of CPSBot bots.
Forger. e Forger tampers with the data coming from sensors,
actuators, and other connected devices. For example, it might lo-
cally modify an actuator value while spoong a remote monitoring
server. We note that the Forger takes advantage of dierent hard-
ware capabilities of the infected bots (e. g., inuence the physical
process). In a typical setup, the number of Forgers is proportional
to the number of CPSBot bots.
Controller. e Controller takes care of the adversarial control
of the target system. In general, the Controller takes input from
the cyber-physical system and optionally from other CPSBot bots,
and predicts the future input-output state. e prediction could be
computed using dierent orthogonal techniques such as machine-
learning classication, real-time simulation, and state estimation
techniques (e. g., Kalman ltering). is functionality is typically
implemented by the C&C in a centralized CPSBot, and by the in-
fected controller devices in a decentralized CPSBot. A discussion
about dierent prediction strategies is presented in Section 6.1.
Broker. e Broker functionality is used to coordinate the CPSBot
network. It asynchronously and synchronously sends event infor-
mation to all the botnet nodes. For example, a Broker manages the
communication between two bots without having them know each
other and even if one of them is disconnected from the CPSBot net-
work. Typically, this functionality is implemented by the C&C in a
centralized botnet and by multiple nodes (e. g., broker clustering) in
a decentralized botnet. We note that, an architecture with multiple
Brokers tolerates single-point-of-failure in the CPSBot network.
Pub. e Pub allows the CPSBot devices to send data over the
botnet network asynchronously. e granularity of the published
content can be set (e. g., publish an aggregate of sensor values versus
a single sensor value). Furthermore, the Pub could set the quality of
service of each published (sent) value. For example, the botmaster
can coordinate the botnet using an event-based priority scheme
dependent by the message type (topic-based) or the message value
(content-based). is functionality is typically carried out by all
CPSBot nodes.
Sub. e Sub allows the CPSBot devices to receive data over the
CPSBot network. Each Sub might subscribe to any information
exchanged in the CPSBot network, and get it on-demand, without
sending a request all the times (event-driven). e subscription
process is pre-congurable to avoid re-subscriptions aer succes-
sive disconnections. Additionally, each Sub can create a session
with the Broker to let it cache lost messages and retrieve them
among re-connection. For example, the C&C node might subscribe
to status-critical information to be informed when any of the bots
is disconnected from the CPSBot network and react accordingly.
Similarly to the Pub functionality, the Sub functionality is typically
implemented by all CPSBot nodes.
In summary, we think that designing a botnet using traits is an
eective way to address the diversity of devices found in cyber-
physical systems. For example, we can use traits to dierentiate
the implementations of bots for network spoong and bots for ad-
versarial control (we will see two concrete examples in Section 3.5).
As a side benet, the usage of traits lowers the development costs
of our CPSBots and this is a key factor for eective cyber-physical
aacks [23].
3.5 Centralized and Decentralized CPSBots
We now present two CPSBots: a centralized botnet aacking a
water distribution system (ICS) and a decentralized botnet aacking
a building automation system (IoT). We choose these examples
because they share similar security functions and weaknesses [8].
For the sub-gures in Figure 2, we represent the devices controlled
by the aacker with black squared boxes. e traits of the CPSBot
devices are represented as black boxes with round corners. e grey
boxes represent the targets. Both botnets derive from the system
and aacker models presented in Section 3.2.
Centralized CPSBot. In this scenario, the aacker is using a cen-
tralized architecture to aack a centralized control system (e. g.,
water distribution system). As depicted in Figure 2a, the system is
composed of n remote substations and a central monitoring SCADA
network. Each substation has a remote terminal unit (RTU) that
interacts with sensors and actuators and a gateway device that con-
nects the RTU to the access router. e botmaster has compromised
n gateway devices (Bot1, . . . , Botn ). Each bot implements the Forger,
Inltrator, Pub and Sub traits. e central C&C is managing all
the bots and it is implementing the Controller, Broker, Pub, and
Sub traits. e bots are altering the state of the physical process
in real time with the help of the C&C while fooling the central
SCADA server that is periodically querying the RTUs. is CPSBot
design is dierent from a traditional one because each bot acts in a
dierent manner according to its substation. For example, the rst
bot is mainly interested in the sensor and actuator values regarding
the rst substation and it generates spoofed commands accordingly.
In a traditional setup, each bot will execute the same orders from
the C&C regardless of which substation it is aecting. More in-
formation about an implementation of this botnet are presented
in Section 4 and the two cyber-physical aacks are evaluated in
Section 5.
Decentralized CPSBot. In this case, the botmaster is using a
decentralized architecture to aack a distributed control system,
in particular, a building automation system (BAC). As we can see
from Figure 2b, the BAC is composed of a heating, ventilation
and air-conditioning system (HVAC), an IP camera (CCTV) and
a lighting control system (LCS). In this case, each infected device
acts both as a bot and as a C&C. All the bots are implementing the
Table 1: antitativemetrics used to evaluate the CPSBot at-
tacks. A checkmark (3) in the CPS column indicates that the
metric is dened by us to address the CPSBot cyber-physical
constraints.
Symbol Metric description CPS
TS [s] Period between two equal requests from
the defender.
3
TC [s] Adversarial estimation period. 3
TM [s] Trac manipulation period. 3
∆s [ms] Delay between the last valid packet and
the rst spoofed packet.
3
∆r [ms] Delay between the last valid request and
the rst spoofed response.
3
µd [ms] Additional delay introduced by the CPSBot. 3
nB Number of bots. 7
ne Number of IDS warnings and errors raised. 7
µCPU Average CPU overhead for the bot. 7
µRAM Average RAM overhead for the bot. 7
Controller trait and they are locally computing their adversarial
estimations. Additionally, they implement the Inltrator, Forger,
Sub and Pub traits. In this scenario, we take advantage of multiple
brokers (e. g., every bot implements the Broker trait) to avoid single-
point-of-failure. For example, if one bot is compromised the others
can still coordinate their actions. is botnet is dierent from
a traditional P2P botnet because each bot has a specic control
strategy depending on the infected device. Additionally, each bot
might share control information with the others even if the target
system is not interlock-based. For example, a botmaster could use
adversarial interlocks to perform cascade cyber-physical aacks
(e. g., induce an LCS blackout while tampering with the HVAC
load).
3.6 Ourantitative Metrics
Conventional botnets are evaluated looking at factors such as num-
ber and geo-locations of bots and C&C servers, malicious DNS
activities, and malware databases [35, 51]. However, we think that
to evaluate cyber-physical botnets we have to dene additional met-
rics. Table 1 lists our set of quantitative metrics that we are using
in Section 5.5 to evaluate our cyber-physical aacks. A checkmark
(3) in the CPS column indicates that the metric is dened by us to
address the CPSBot cyber-physical constraints.
4 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR ICS
In this section, we present an implementation of a centralized CPS-
Bot to aack a water distribution industrial control system. In
particular, the system is controlled using the Modbus/TCP protocol.
We start by mapping the network architecture sketched in Figure 2a
to a water distribution network. We then describe how we deal
with the target industrial protocol and the botnet C&C channel
protocol. We conclude the section showing how we implemented
some specic PubSub features to beer coordinate the CPSBot bots.
   
(a) Centralized botnet targeting a distributed ICS (e. g., water dis-
tribution system).
(b) Decentralized botnet targeting an IoT system (e. g., building
automation system)
Figure 2: High-level viewof an ICS and IoTCPSBot. Grey boxes represent the targets. e black boxes are the devices controlled
by the attacker. Rounded black boxes represent the traits supported by the CPSBot devices.
4.1 Network Topology
Figure 3 shows the network topology of a water distribution ICS
already compromised by a centralized CPSBot. ere are n + 2
networks: n substation networks, the SCADA network, and the
aacker network. Each network has a border router connected
to the Internet. e remote terminal units (RTU) are managing
local sensors and actuators and they are communicating with the
central SCADA server through gateway devices. A network-based
intrusion detection system (IDS) is monitoring the inbound and
outbound trac from the SCADA network. e aacker infected
n gateway devices that are siing in between the RTUs and the
border routers. e botmaster uses the symbolic links colored in
red to communicate with the bots.
4.2 Target Protocol: Modbus/TCP
We choose Modbus [33] and in particular Modbus/TCP as a target
industrial protocol because it is still widely used on actual indus-
trial plants[39]. Furthermore, Modbus/TCP is adopted in WaDi, the
water distribution testbed that we use for our aacks. We under-
stand that Modbus (as many popular industrial protocols) is not
secure by design. However, we are not interested in discovering or
underlying existent Modbus vulnerabilities.
Modbus includes two data types: registers and bit elds. Regis-
ters are 16-bit integers and they are either read-only (input registers)
or read and write (holding registers). Bit elds are either read-only
(discrete inputs) or read and write (coils). All data types are ad-
dressed like an array in memory and the rst array element is at
oset zero. Modbus/TCP is a client-server application layer pro-
tocol. A Modbus request has a Modbus/TCP header that contains:
the transaction number (set by the client and echoed back by the
server), the length of the payload, the protocol ID, and the slave ID.
e payload of the Modbus request addresses the requested data
with a function code, a memory oset, and a word count. A Modbus
response contains a similar Modbus/TCP header and its payload
contains the same function code of the corresponding request, a
byte count, and the requested data.
Modbus operations are encoded with numeric function codes.
e aack that we present in Section 5 focus on three of them: read
coils (0x01), read holding registers (0x03), and write single coil (
0x05). Read coils is used by a Modbus client to read multiple binary
values from a Modbus server. Read holding registers are used by
a Modbus client to read multiple 16-bit registers from a Modbus
server. Write single coil is used by the Modbus client to write a
single bit to a Modbus server.
It is worth mentioning that the Modbus packets are transmied
using network ordering (e. g., big endian) but the bit elds are stored
in reverse bit order. Hence, if the rst byte of the coil memory
contains the following bits 01100011, then the last (eighth) bit will
map to the rst coil and its value will represent True (1), the seventh
bit will map to the second coil and its value will represent True (1),
and so on.
4.3 C&C Channel: MQTT
We use the Message euing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) proto-
col for the implementation of the C&C control channel. MQTT is a
topic-based PubSub protocol, designed for low-bandwidth, high-la-
tency Machine to Machine (M2M) communication [50]. By default,
it runs over TCP, it supports TLS and password-based authentica-
tion of clients. All the messages exchanged in the CPSBot botnet
are addressable by topic, and their payload is data-agnostic. Topics
can be hierarchically organized with dierent paths and each path
can contain sub-paths. e set of all topics is called the topic tree,
and its design is key for an eective MQTT botnet coordination.
In Figure 4 we present our implementation of a topic tree suitable
to manage our CPSBot aacking a water distribution system. It
includes n + 1 paths, where n is the number of aacked substations.
e cpsb path contains one sub-path for each CPSBot device (in
this case n + 1 sub-paths). For example, if a node subscribes to
the cpsb/bot1/dead topic, then it will receive updates when the
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Figure 3: Centralized CPSBot attacking awater distribution ICS.ere aren substations. Each substation has a remote terminal
unit (RTU), and a compromised gateway device (Bot). e SCADA server is in the central control network. e attacker (via
the C&C) coordinates the bots from a remote location using the red links.
bot in the rst substation is disconnecting from the network (to-
gether with all the other subscribers). Another usage of this path
concerns the maintenance of the bots. For example, we can use
cpsb/bot1/sw to send binary soware updates to the subscribed
clients. e subx paths contain the information about the water
distribution substations. Each sub-path manages a device (only
RTUs in this case) and each sub-sub-path manages sensor and ac-
tuator values using the same memory mapping of the target RTU.
For example, the sub1/rtu1/hrs topics contain all the messages
regarding the values of the holding registers of the rst RTU.
We used mosquitto for the MQTT broker and paho for the
MQTT clients. Note that our MQTT setup does not depend on the
target industrial protocol and with minor modications, it can be
adopted for other physical processes.
4.4 Coordination of the CPSBot Nodes
MQTT provides several useful functionalities that we are using for
coordinated interactions among CPSBot bots. We comment ve of
them:
Message QoS. Each publish and subscribe action can be congured
with a quality of service (QoS) value. ere are three possible QoS
values for delivering a packet at most once (QoS = 0), at least once
(QoS = 1), and exactly once (QoS = 2). e default publish and
subscribe QoS values are 0 and increasing QoS values result in a
bigger protocol overhead. Each client subscribes to topics with a
QoS and receives published messages with that QoS, even if the
publisher is seing a higher QoS. We use MQTT’s QoS to build a
cpsb/bot1/dead
       /bot1/...
       /botn/...
       /cc/...
        ...
sub1/rtu1/hrs/hr1
       /rtu1/hrs/...
       /rtu1/cos/...
       /rtun/.../...
        ...
subn/rtu1/hrs/hr1
       /rtu1/hrs/...
       /rtu1/cos/...
       /rtun/.../...
        ...        ...
Root 1 Root 2 Root n+1
Figure 4: CPSBot hierarchical topics tree design with n + 1
paths. e cpsb path takes care of the messages about the
botnet devices. ere are n sub paths, each one takes care of
the messages about a water distribution substation.
priority scheme based on the message topic. For example, we give
maximum priority (QoS = 2) to messages about bot disconnections
and medium priority (QoS = 1) to messages about botnet mainte-
nance, critical sensors and actuators values, and low priority (QoS
= 0) to the other messages.
Client sessions. MQTT consents to store in the broker(s) a sub-
scription session for each subscriber (client) using a unique ID. We
use this feature to optimize the clients’ subscription process and
message recovery. If the client session is turned on (e. g., by seing
the clean session ag to False) then the client subscribes once
to the topics of interest and it does not need to resubscribe upon
re-connection. Furthermore, the broker stores all the missed pub-
lished messages with QoS greater than 0 and it re-publishes them
when the client reconnects if the subscription was made with QoS
greater than 0.
Asynchronous connections. MQTT supports both blocking (syn-
chronous) and non-blocking (asynchronous) connections to the
broker. We decided to use non-blocking clients and servers to op-
timize the usage of the CPSBots nodes. For example, a bot might
perform other tasks while waiting to establish a connection with a
broker.
Subscription with wildcards. MQTT supports meta-characters
to eciently subscribe to multiple topics. For example, to subscribe
to all coils messages from the second substation a bot can subscribe
to sub2/+/cos/*. e + meta-character subscribes to all the topics
at the current path level, while the * meta-character subscribes
to all the topics in the current path level and below. We use this
feature in combination with our topic tree design to allow easy
subscriptions to intra-substation and inter-substations topics.
Parametric keep-alive interval. MQTT is transported over TCP
and sometimes one of the two hosts in a TCP stream is not working
properly. is situation is called half-open connection problem and
the MQTT keep-alive functionality is used to x it. Each client
can communicate the (maximum) keep-alive time in seconds which
broker and client can endure without sending a message. e
default keep-alive time is 60 seconds, and if it is set to 0 then this
mechanism is not used. We use this feature to ensure that each
communication link is working as expected and to manage the
Figure 5: A CPSBot attack has four phases. Reconnaissance,
Initialization, Develop Strategy, and Delivery. e rst two
phases are common to all CPSBot attacks. e last two are
iterative.
relative geographic positions of the MQTT client and the MQTT
broker. For example, clients that are geographically closer to the
broker may be congured with a lower keep-alive value than the
ones that are farther apart.
5 CASE STUDY: ATTACKS ON ICS
In this section, we present two cyber-physical aacks performed
on simulated and real water distribution testbeds. e aacks
use the centralized CPSBot implemented in Section 4. We rst
performed simulated aacks to speed-up the development time
and to reduce the risk of damaging actual components. en we
performed the same aacks on the Water Distribution testbed (pre-
sented in Section 2.3). We start this section by describing the phases
of CPSBot-based aack. en we report on the initialization, dis-
tributed impersonation and distributed replay phases. We conclude
the section with a quantitative evaluation of the presented aacks
using the metrics dened in Section 3.6.
5.1 Phases of CPSBot-based Attack
A CPSBot-based aack can be decomposed into four phases based
on the industrial control system cyber kill chain [26]. e aack
phases are depicted in Figure 5). Firstly, we have the Reconnaissance
phase. is is a preliminary phase where the aacker tries to get
as much information as possible about the target system. Secondly,
we have the Initialization phase. In this phase, the botmaster com-
pletes the initial infection, second infection, and rallying phases.
irdly, we have the Develop Strategy phase. In this phase, the bots
observe the network and the physical process and develop dierent
aack options with the help of the C&C and the botmaster. Finally,
we have the Delivery phase where the botmaster launches the at-
tack(s) and tries to reach one or multiple goals. In Figure 5 we list
several traditional goals such as DDoS, replay and eavesdropping
and cyber-physical goals such as distributed replay and distributed
impersonation. We note that CPSBot allows delivering multiple
non-interfering aacks at the same time (e. g., impersonate a device
while eavesdropping the communications).
In the following section, we assume that the aacker already
completed the rst two aack phases (that are common to all CPS-
Bot aacks) and we discuss two advanced cyber-physical goals:
distributed impersonation and distributed replay, Distributed im-
personation allows the aacker to impersonate multiple gateway
devices at the same time and coordinate their responses to the
SCADA server. (see Section 5.3). Distributed replay enables the
aacker to programmatically replay messages across substations
(see Section 5.4).
5.2 Initialization Phase
Figure 6 presents an aack scenario where a CPSBot bot already
infected a gateway device of WaDi. e bot, as in Figure 3, sits in
between the remote terminal unit (RTU) and the access router of
the substation. e bot is implementing the Inltrator, Forger, Pub
and Sub traits, indeed it is able to spoof the packets coming from
its network interfaces.
Part of the initialization phase is accomplished using a combina-
tion of Ethernet bridging and forwarding techniques, see top-le
1© in Figure 6. Basically, an Ethernet bridge is a virtual switch that
forwards all the trac from eth0 to eth1 and vice-versa. It can
be congured to act as a rewall at the link and network layers.
Once the bridge is established, then the bot is able to observe all the
trac between the RTU and the access router through the bridge
interface (br1). e infected gateway devices are running Linux
and we used bridge-utils, iptables, and ebtables tools to con-
gure the bridges on the bots. e setup can be easily extended to
bridge more than two interfaces.
Additionally, in order to optimize the CPSBot boot time, we
are using the initialization phase to start the functionalities of the
command and control node. Firstly, the C&C Broker is starting a
mosquitto MQTT broker with a customizable conguration le.
en, the C&C Pub and Sub are starting asynchronous paho MQTT
clients to establish the CPSBot network. Finally, the C&C Controller
starts in idle-mode because there is no physical process data to be
processed, see boom-right 1© in Figure 6.
5.3 Distributed Impersonation Phase
At the beginning of the distributed impersonation phase, the bot
Inltrator isolates the RTU from the central SCADA network. is
is done by modifying the network interfaces of the bot such that
eth1 has the same IP and MAC addresses of the impersonated RTU,
see center-le 2© in Figure 6. ose steps are performed using
a combination of ifconfig, brctl and route Linux commands.
en the bot starts a Modbus/TCP server listening on the same IP
and port of the real RTU server. e updating period of the bot
server is congurable via the time manipulation (TM ) parameter.
e server is implemented using pymodbus and it runs in asynchro-
nous mode using multiple threads. Once the server is running then
the Pub, Sub, and Forger kick in by running the mn.py script. e
script activates an asynchronous paho MQTT client that let the bot
joint the CPSBot network and enables packet spoong on the bot.
Note that aer these steps the bot is still connected to the RTU.
Let’s assume that Figure 6 represents an impersonation aack on
the rst substation. Let’s see how a bot is using the C&C Controller
to send a valid Modbus/TCP response aer a valid request from
the remote SCADA, see center-right 2© in Figure 6. e bot inter-
cepts the Modbus request (Inltrator), extracts the addresses of the
requested values (Forger), and passes them to the Pub component.
e Pub publishes those addresses into the relevant sub1/rtu1
topics. e C&C Broker module, which is orchestrating the CPSBot
network, collects those messages. e C&C Sub module then re-
ceives the messages containing the SCADA request addresses from
the Broker and pass them to the Controller module. e Controller
produces valid response values according to some estimation tech-
nique. A discussion about some potential estimation techniques
  
 
 
Figure 6: A CPSBot-based attack on the Water Distribution. Grey/black lines and boxes represent the ICS/CPSBot links and
devices. In the initialization phase, the bot is bridging between the RTU and the router, and the C&C starts the Broker process
and the Pub and Sub clients 1©. In the distributed impersonation phase the bot disconnects the RTU from the network and
start impersonating it by answering to the SCADA requests using the responses produced by the C&C Controller 2©. e
same phases take place on the other substations at the same time. Once the botmaster impersonates all the RTUs then she
can target the real ones 3©.
is presented in Section 6.1. e estimated response values pro-
duced by the Controller are then published by the C&C Pub module
to the relevant sub1/rtu1 topics. e bot Sub module receives
the estimated responses from the C&C Broker and passes them to
the Forger. en the Forger creates a valid Modbus/TCP response
packet and sends it to the SCADA via the Inltrator.
e same impersonation technique is applied in each substation
at the same time. In general, this aack is distributed because it
disconnects all the RTUs. It is coordinated since each bot publishes
information about its controlled substation and subscribes to in-
formation about other substations and about the status of other
CPSBot devices. It is cyber-physical because once the botmaster is
able to impersonate all the RTUs then she can target the real ones
causing high-impact damages on the substations, while fooling the
SCADA server, see boom-le 3© in Figure 6.
5.4 Distributed Replay Phase
e distributed replay aack is similar to a wireless wormhole at-
tack [12]. is type of aack enables a bot to replay locally requests
and responses that are coming from other remote substations.
We now explain how to replay the content of a Modbus response
from the second substation to the rst one. Let’s assume that
the target request-response concerns the 100th holding register
of the RTU in the second substation. We assume that the bots
have already completed the initialization phase in the rst and
second substation. en, the bot in the second substation will use a
combination of iptables and libnetfilter queue commands to
extract in real time the hr100 payload from each valid RTU response.
It will then publish those payloads in the sub1/rtu1/hrs/hr100
response topic. e bot in the rst substation is subscribed to all
the topics concerned sub1. Indeed it will be able to reply to a hr100
SCADA request from the rst RTU, with whatever hr100 value is
contained in the second RTU.
We note that the same technique can be used on dierent device’s
types, on arbitrary sensor and actuator values and dierent substa-
tions at the same time. e result is a coordinated cyber-physical
aack that can potentially alter the state of several substations
without requiring detailed knowledge of the physical process by
the botmaster (e. g., if aack is successful in one substation replay
it on the others).
5.5 Evaluation of the CPSBot Attacks
We performed a series of measurements on the C&C and two bots
while conducting the distributed impersonation and distributed
replay aacks both in the simulated and real Water Distribution.
For the network analysis, we used Wireshark’s built-in statistics
and expert information to measure delays and to ag anomalies in
TCP connections. While we used Wireshark for convenience, we
note that detection rules in popular IDS, such as Bro and Snort will
work similarly [45], so we expect the results to be representative.
e main dierences between the simulated and the real CPSBot
aacks are in terms of hardware. In the simulated aack, we used
MiniCPS [5] to simulate a CPSBot-based aack on Water Distri-
bution. MiniCPS is a toolkit to perform real-time cyber-physical
system simulations using lightweight virtualization and it is based
on mininet [52]. For the real aacks performed on the Water Dis-
tribution testbed (see Section 2.3), we used a commercial laptop
running a Linux OS to host the C&C station, and we modied
Linux-based gateway devices to act as bots. e same code was run
for the simulated and real initialization, distributed impersonation
and distributed replay phases. What changed were the IP addresses
(because of DHCP) and the network interface names (since they
are set by the OS).
Table 2 lists the results of our evaluation using the metrics pre-
sented in Section 3.6. e SCADA polling period is in the order
of few seconds (TS ) and we set the adversarial estimation period
(TC ) and the maximum trac manipulation periods (TM ) to approx-
imately be the half of it. Both simulated and real aacks generated
one and four warning messages about TCP packets with the reset
ag set. We note that those few warning messages could be avoided
by improving the way the bot handles existing TCP connections
aer the aack starts.
Recall that µd denotes the average delay introduced by the CPS-
Bot. In our experiments, µd was computed from the central SCADA
server comparing the response times while the system was and was
not under aack. Interestingly, µd resulted to be close to 0 ms. is
means that our centralized CPSBot implementation did not cause
signicant delays in the real and simulated SCADA system. We
expect that this is due to our asynchronous communications (e. g.,
bots do not have to periodically wait for the messages coming from
the C&C) and our custom traits for the bots and the C&C (e. g., bots
implementation is focused on the network manipulation while the
C&C focuses on the adversarial control).
A minor issue that we experienced aacking the real testbed is
related to ∆s and ∆r that are respectively the average time dier-
ence between the last valid RTU packet and the rst packet spoofed
by a bot, and the average time dierence between the last SCADA
request and the rst valid spoofed response by a bot. We have
a signicant discrepancy between the aacks in the simulation
framework (few milliseconds) and in the real testbed (seconds).
However, this situation is experienced only one time when the
aack is started, nonetheless, we are planning to conduct more ex-
periments to beer investigate it. Finally, we note that the average
CPU load and memory (RAM) consumption on each bot is under
30%. is should allow performing the same aacks using devices
that are even less powerful than our infected gateway devices.
6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss dierent ways to develop an adversarial
control strategy, several methods to increase the stealthiness of our
CPSBots and some techniques to optimize the presented aack.
6.1 CPSBot: Control Strategies
So far, we have not discussed how the aacker should develop a
suitable control strategy to take over the physical process state. We
now briey outline dierent potential approaches. Implementing
and evaluating those approaches is out of the scope of this work,
and we plan to do so in future work.
In general, the aacker has to learn how the physical process
reacts to changes in actuator states, and how the state of the physical
process is transitioning over time. Such knowledge can be obtained
through physical process estimations [22, 31], manual data analysis,
and machine learning approaches (e.g., similar to the ones employed
for aack detection for CPS [40]). General learning of target CPS
infrastructure has been discussed in [19].
Based on a solid understanding of the process, the aacker needs
to nd a sequence of actions that will lead to the goal state of the
system, potentially while considering legitimate control reactions
that are not under the inuence of the aacker. In addition, it is
likely that the physical process simulation would be optimized to
remain hidden from process observers for as long as possible, or
reaches its goal as soon as possible (related tradeos are discussed
in [54]). Commonly, such control strategies require continuous
tracking of the process physical evolutions using state estimation
techniques such as Kalman lters and Luenberger observers.
6.2 CPSBot: Stealthiness
ere are several ways to increase CPSBot stealthiness. We present
a brief discussion about two strategies:
Stepping stones. We might want to introduce extra devices as
intermediate proxies in the communication between the bots and
the C&C [28] over the Internet. ose extra nodes might intro-
duce secure tunnels (e. g., use Tor [44]). With this solution, we
pay a penalty in terms of botnet latency and we should take into
consideration if the tradeo is worth.
C&C Protocol. We understand that using a protocol for the C&C
channel that is dierent from the target one might increase the
possibility of detection. However, this is the case also when the
C&C is using the same protocol as the target system [55]. Two
solutions to mitigate this problem are encryption (e. g., TLS) and
obfuscation (e. g., obfuscated data structures for MQTT messages).
7 RELATEDWORK
We’ve seen novel designs of botnets from the cyber-security eld.
For example, DNS botnet [4], structured and unstructured peer-to-
peer botnets [42, 56], server-less botnets [58], botnet-as-a-service [11],
mobile botnets [34], bitcoin-powered botnets [3] and botnets piv-
oting from social networks [13]. However, those designs are not
addressing cyber-physical systems and OT networks.
ere are several interesting analysis of traditional IT botnets.
In [51], the authors managed to act as fake C&C servers and col-
lected information about the Torpig botnet. In [2], the authors
presented a system able to capture and track more than 100 unique
IRC-based botnets to measure the percentage of malicious trac
aributed to those botnets on the Internet. In [35], the authors
proposed a botnet take-down analysis and recommendation system.
However, none of those papers analyzes a cyber-physical botnet
with suitable quantitative metrics such as latency and size of the
C&C packets.
ere are recent academic works about cyber-physical aacks
targeting several CPS devices. In particular, preferred targets are
programmable logic controller (PLC). Authors discussed ransom-
ware [20], rmware modications [14], rootkits [1], physics-aware
malware [21], and stealthy Man-in-the-Middle [53] aacks. Re-
cently, we have seen in the wild targeted aacks on Safety Instru-
mented Systems (SIS) [25]. ose aacks target a single device and
they are not performed using (cyber-physical) botnets.
We have seen also aempts to detect botnets for CPS. In particu-
lar, in [57] the authors are trying to detect P2P SCADA botnets by
means of custom network monitoring. However, they assume to
be aacked by a traditional P2P botnet.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we argue that adversarial control aacks on CPS
requires a novel class of botnets that we dene as cyber-physical.
ose botnets have dierent requirements from traditional IT bot-
nets such as usage of adversarial control strategies, coordinated
Table 2: Evaluation of CPSBot attacks in a simulated environment and real testbed. TS , TC , TM are the SCADA, adversarial
estimation and trac manipulation periods. ∆s is the average time dierence between the last valid RTU packet and the rst
packet spoofed by a bot. ∆r is the average time dierence between the last SCADA request and the rst valid spoofed bot
response. µd is the additional average delay introduced by the CPSBot measured from the SCADA server. ne is the number of
Wireshark’s expert info warnings and error messages. µCPU and µRAM are the approximate average CPU and RAM load on
each bot. nB is the number of controlled substations. Our optimized CPSBot implementation is able to attack the system with
delay (µd = 0) as measured at the SCADA server.
Attack TS [s] TC [s] TM [s] ∆s [ms] ∆r [ms] µd [ms] ne µCPU µRAM nB
Simulated Distributed Impersonation 1.5 0.8 0.6 2.6 3.6 0.0 1 2% 20% 2
Real Distributed Impersonation 1.0 0.5 0.5 7000 7010 0.0 4 10% 30% 2
Simulated Distributed Replay 1.5 0.8 0.6 43 44 0.0 1 2% 20% 2
Real Distributed Replay 1.0 0.5 0.5 7071 7069 0.0 4 10% 30% 2
interactions among the bots, and additional constraints from the
target system.
To address those challenges we presented CPSBot: a frame-
work to build cyber-physical botnets. We leverage on a publisher-
subscriber paradigm for the C&C channel to coordinate our bots
with minimal overhead. We dene an orthogonal set of traits to
customize our bots and C&Cs according to their role in the aack
and their hardware and soware capabilities. For example, the
bots might be specialized for packet manipulation while a C&C
focuses on generating adversarial control decisions. CPSBot allows
using dierent adversarial control strategies like machine learning
classication, real-time simulation, and Kalman ltering estimation.
Furthermore, we are able to adapt our botnets to dierent network
architectures, protocols, and physical processes.
We showed the design of a centralized botnet to aack a centrally
controlled CPS and a decentralized botnet to aack a CPS with
distributed control. We implemented the former using MQTT for
the C&C protocol and Modbus/TCP as the target network protocol.
We evaluate our implementation by performing two coordinated
cyber-physical aacks: distributed eavesdropping, and distributed
impersonation. We evaluate our aacks with custom cyber-physical
botnets metrics and we showed that our CPSBot introduces zero
additional delay (µd = 0) while the system is under aack. As result,
CPSBot is able to conduct aacks that cause minimal temporal
changes to the trac, which hide the manipulation from operational
alarms that might be in place.
We expect those ndings on capabilities will raise awareness
with stakeholders of threatened systems, and allow the defenders to
design more suitable countermeasures. Potential countermeasures
against our CPSBot would include close monitoring of physical
process states with hardened sensors, general hardening of indus-
trial devices against exploitation, and network segmentation and
monitoring.
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